part I part II part III
Two Factions
Within the Bourgeois-Imperialist Counter-Revolution
Part I
Extracted from Besooy-e-Sosyalism No. 1 July 1980
The February Uprising did not resolve the struggle over political power, but developed it from a historical-class point at view. For although it temporarily withdrew the question of seizure of political power from the agenda of immediate struggles of the revolutionary masses -- who were under the illusion that victory was at hand - it at the same time provided the grounds for the representation of this question in more direct terms, released from the narrow framework of an above-class anti-monarchist struggle which, in the context of the absence of an independent proletarian policy, had been imposed on the revolutionary movement by the liberal bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeois leadership. The February Uprising was, therefore, a determining moment in exposing the class content of the Iranian revolution. The Uprising emphasised the reality that the final resolution of the current revolution, as a democratic revolution in a capitalist country dominated by imperialism, above all requires the settling account between the two main classes of society, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie; and that both the revolution and the counter-revolution still have to develop in so far as their class composition, their ideological and political leadership and also their slogans and methods are Concerned.
The Uprising entrusted the decisive conclusion of the present revolution to the process of more concrete formation of the forces of the revolution and the Counter-revolution. Thus the history of our revolution after the February Uprising is indeed but the history of the development and formation of the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution.
In spite of all its eclecticism and Confusion, the communist movement has elucidated the general outlines of the necessary process of development of the camp of the revolution for victory: the independent rank of the revolutionary proletariat must be established; the class party of the proletariat, the communist party, must be founded on the basis of Leninist stands, taking over the leadership of this independent rank and thereby the leadership of the revolutionary democratic movement, organising and leading the struggle for the smash of the state machine of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. The examination of the ideological, political and organisational causes of the failure in fulfilling the needs of the revolutionary proletariat in the long-term opportunity there existed especially after the February
Uprising itself requires a separate analysis by the communists. However, one can hope that the struggle which is today arising in the communist movement between revolutionary Marxism and opportunism and revisionism, may open the way for this cause.
But, what we are here concerned with is to study the manner of formation of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution. We also intend to examine the causes of the emergence of that specific bourgeois political force capable of organising the ranks of the counter-revolution in its final onslaught against the camp of the revolution, and leading the, final attempt of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to consolidate its political power. The discussion of the factions within the ruling body must not be looked upon outside this context. The government which took shape from the midst of, or rather in spite of, the February Uprising, was undoubtedly the initial form of the political leadership of the counterrevolution. Therefore, as we asserted from the day after the Uprising it must be viewed and understood as a bourgeois government committed to defending capital and imperialism. For this reason, we at the outset have clarified our position with regard to the general framework of the conflicts between the two factions which have appeared today as the
Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and the Bani-Sadrist tendency: the discussion is about the analysis of the two factions within the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution and in this analysis, contrary to many nationalists and humanists in Marxism's clothing, we neither seek to find a progressive, national, popular, and so forth, faction in the government, nor an "ally" and an issue in the latter deserving "conditional support" on the part of the proletariat; but rather we are in search of the place acquired by each of the two factions in the counterrevolutionary struggle of imperialism. The basic and general outlines of the counterrevo1utiony struggle are quite clear:
1) The Iranian revolution must be suppressed; the revolutionary workers and toilers and their political organisations must be crushed; the Ariyamehrian[1] repression must prevail throughout the country and, in one word, the bourgeois counter-revolutionary order must be restored in the society; and
2) A new cycle of capital accumulation must start; the defeated workers and toilers, under an unprecedented poverty and destitution, must render their labour power for the lowest price to capital in absolute silence and capitulation, so that the economic crisis of capital tends to abate and, in one word, a productive order corresponding to a capitalist country dominated by imperialism returns to the country -- an order of which the mercenary Shah was the genuine representative and the guarantor of its provision for all strata of capital.
The conflicts there existed within the government since the morrow of the Uprising, are first and foremost expressive of the lack of consensus within the ranks of the counter-revolution with respect to ins and outs of a process in which the above conditions for the consolidation of the sway of capital can be realized. And it is precisely over this question that the two present factions of the counter-revolution are driven into an open conflict; they persistently struggle to call upon the bourgeoisie to adopt their proposed methods, policies and tactics, and endeavour to secure consensus in the ranks of the bourgeoisie upon definite policies and tactics. The bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution will regain, from the midst of these struggles, the form and mould of its final move. Further, the political force and the political-ideological framework which could best represent and lead the bourgeoisie in its counter-revolutionary movement will take shape.
From what we have said, it is first and foremost clear that we believe that neither of the two present factions in the government, i.e. the IRP and the Bani-Sadr's bourgeois-liberal current, on its own possesses the necessary and adequate features to acquire the position of the single political representation and leadership of the bourgeoisie in the revolution. In particular, in case of the defeat of revolution, neither of them on its own may constitute the long-term governmental alternative of this class. In other words, in our opinion, the ultimate formation of the political leader-ship of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution is neither through the unilateral supremacy of one faction over the other, nor through the elimination of one and the survival and rise of the other, but rather through the ascension of the two factions to a higher level and the arising of that third force which will synthesize and unite the counter-revolutionary characteristics and the bourgeois essence of the policies and tactics of both factions in a single political-organisational institution clear from the limitations and shortcomings of each, coinciding to a greater extent with the interests of capital in a country like Iran.
Thus the examination and analysis of the position of the two factions in the present ruling body and their conflicts can be made by an attempt to answer the following three fundamental questions:
1) Why does the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution not possess the necessary ideological, political and organisational coherence? What objective and subjective conditions in society have hindered the bourgeoisie to regain its single political representative and leadership?
2) What political and ideological features and aspects must this single political leadership of the bourgeoisie -- which in our belief should take shape from the midst of the conflicts of these two factions, and on the basis of the negation of both -- possess? Or, in more precise terms, which aspects and features of the present two factions must be preserved and developed in a third political force which would unify the bourgeoisie, and which aspects and characteristics must be negated and discarded? And,
3) Which place and significance each of these two factions possess in organising and leading the camp of the counter-revolution, as long as the objective and subjective grounds for this political synthesis are not provided?
In this part, we are mainly concerned with the examination of the first question. Regarding the two other questions, we are here content with few general and brief remarks, and leave the detailed discussion of them to the next part.
Where should we search for the basis of the political-ideological inconsistencies existing in the camp of the counter revolution? In our previous writings, we have noted the Shah's dictatorial regime as the representative and guardian of the total capital and all strata of the bourgeoisie in Iran. This is a reality which today, a year and a few months after an insurrection which overthrew the monarchy, is being proven not only to the communist movement whose conscience was hurt by even thinking of tae unity of the interests of the "national bourgeoisie" and the Shah's regime, but also to the bourgeoisie itself. The Shah's dictator-ship, of course, did not enjoy an active class basis even within the bourgeoisie itself. This is an undeniable fact. The Shah's rule, however, had been turned into the genuine protector and defender of the interests of all strata of capital in the country, not due to the political-ideological vote of confidence of the Iranian bourgeoisie for it, but by virtue of the economic and practical vote of confidence of all strata of capital in the domestic market to the operation of monopoly capital, whose interests had been represented directly and immediately by the Shah's regime since the expropriation of the 40's [1960's]. It is true that the Shah's government was not an achievement of the economic, political and ideological struggles of the native bourgeoisie against feudalism. Nor was it a government whose legislative and executive institutions as well as the ideological grounds of its legitimacy and rightfulness had been established, at the expense of a persistent struggle against the old system, by the Iranian bourgeoisie, and to the defence of which the bourgeoisie had consciously committed itself.
Nor a government whose necessity and desirability had been grasped by the Iranian bourgeoisie in the course of struggle against feudalism, and for the establishment and preservation of which the bourgeoisie had fought. Yes, it is true that the Shah's government was an "imposed" gift of the imperialist monopolies to the Iranian bourgeoisie. But all these realities do not diminish an iota the determining role and place of the Shah's regime in the political representation and leadership of the Iranian bourgeoisie, and in the maintenance of its inner political coherence. The reality is that the Iranian bourgeoisie not only, due to certain historical reasons, never resorted to such a consistent class struggle against feudalism, but owes its emergence as the main exploiting class in society -- that is to say the destruction of feudalism and the establishment of bourgeois society in Iran -- to this very monopoly capital and its rule. More importantly, the Iranian bourgeoisie, freshly released from the fetters of feudalism, after the establishment of capitalist system in the country, stepped into a period in which the course of speed of capital accumulation, despite short pauses, was unprecedented throughout the world; and this was due to nothing but the economic sway of monopoly capital and the determining role of the regime of the mercenary Shah in preserving and defending the foundations of imperialist exploitation of Iran's young working class. That the Shah's regime did not enjoy a broad class base and an active support within the Iranian bourgeoisie, was not because it was not virtually the political representation and a government serving the whole of the bourgeois class. Rather, it was because of the fact that the Iranian bourgeoisie itself, for various historical-class reasons, was not essentially in a situation to clearly understand the significance and role of that government in its survival, especially in the epoch of proletarian revolutions. The Iranian bourgeoisie, since its inception as the main exploiting class in society, was faced with the indisputable economic away of monopoly capital, for the expropriation of the 40's (the Land Reform) was itself an imperialistic process. But, on the other hand, the operation of monopoly capital was the necessary condition and the guarantor of the favourable conditions of profit making for all strata of capital in the country. In the economic sphere, therefore, there could be no other "vanguard" for the Iranian bourgeoisie but the imperialist monopolies. From the political point of view, however, the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran and its liberal representatives did not have a clear class understanding. They had at the outset said "yes" to the imperialist reforms and "no" to its dictatorship[2]. They did not understand the essential relationship between the continuances of these "reforms" that is the maintenance and expansion of the conditions of profit making for capital and the political overt dictatorship (that is the undemocratic centralism within the bourgeoisie). The understanding of the relationship between economy and politics for the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran required more economic and political experience such as the revolutionary crisis it has undergone during the last two years; experiences which make it broad-minded enabling it to grasp and under-stand the logic of its compassionate but indeed relentless guardian, that is monopoly capital and its mercenary government.
In this way, the Iranian bourgeoisie's content with the Shah's government may not be sought in the emergence of genuine monarchist parties (for the bourgeoisie did not basically find any need for party struggle, thanks to the existence of such government), but in the rate of capital accumulation in the domestic market and the political silence of the Iranian bourgeoisie (who had given up even the idea of saying "No" to the imperialist dictatorship) after the Land Reforms. The Shah's regime was both the symbol and the agent of preserving the inner coherence of the Iranian bourgeoisie. For it was the guarantor of the existence of such conditions of profit making for all strata of capital in the domestic market that the bourgeoisie had essentially entrusted the political thinking and practice to it, and itself was drawn into "accumulation and accumulation". And if the liberal representatives of non-monopoly capital used to groan every now and then, this was simply the reflection of the passive position of non-monopoly capital in an economy under the sway of the monopolies, and [also] the reflection of the dangers faced by non-monopoly capital, by virtue of this passive position, with any change in the parameters of production and competition. However, this "imposed" and not completely understood (on the part of the liberal bourgeoisie) coherence could only survive in so far as there was no serious barrier to the accumulation of capital; once the economic crisis intensified and led to a political crisis driving the deprived classes of society to question the government, the ideological separation between the bourgeoisie and its government acquired a determining role. The weakening of the inner unity of the bourgeoisie in periods of economic crisis and intensification of competition is a natural phenomenon. But this "natural phenomena", due to the particular burden of the crisis upon non-monopoly capital (relative to monopoly capital) on the one hand, and the Iranian non-monopoly bourgeoisie's lack of awareness of the determining place of the Shah's regime in its economic existence on the other hand, assumed an immense, and from the bourgeoisie's point of view, totally destructive dimensions. The non-monopoly bourgeoisie and its liberal representatives did not completely understand and fulfil their role in the defence of a regime which was at least for fifteen years long the defender of the brisk business of plunder. Without due attention to what they were about to lose, and in dread of the escalation of the mass movement, they wavered and turned their backs on their government. Monopoly capital did not succeed in making the non-monopoly bourgeoisie and its liberal representatives understand the necessity of active defence of the Shah's government. Thus, these nest con-fused representatives of capital, or better say the representatives of the illusion of capital in a country dominated by imperialism themselves turned into an important factor in the weakening of the bourgeoisie's political-ideological coherence. Yes, we too believe that the liberal bourgeoisie has displayed "wavering", but not as a part of the camp of the "revolution" and towards the "struggle", but as a part of the "counter-revolution" and with regard to the "suppression of the revolutionary movement". In this way, if in the beginning of the revolution, the economic crisis and the intensification of competition within the Iranian bourgeoisie brought forth the objective grounds for the weakening of the bourgeoisie's inner coherence, the escalation of the mass movement, the fear of the Iranian bourgeoisie and the failure of the liberal bourgeoisie to under-stand concretely the political-ideological needs of the sway of capital in Iran, provided its subjective grounds, aggravating the political tension within the bourgeoisie.
The political representatives of mono-poly capital and the liberal bourgeoisie of Iran, constituted the two factions of the bourgeois-imperialist counter-revolution until the compromise of the winter of 1357 [1919-Ed.]; a compromise which was not only the point of betrayal by the petty-bourgeois leadership of the revolutionary movement, but also the point of retreat for monopoly capital. When the escalation of the revolutionary movement made the Shah's overthrow inevitable, monopoly capital was forced to retreat to the position of the liberal bourgeoisie which was trying to bridle the revolutionary movement at the level [it had already reached]. The conciliatory petty-bourgeois leadership whose revolutionism was to become void of any kind of content with the downfall of the monarchical regime, and who had found out the inevitability of the emergence of new revolutionary leaders with the advance of the masses' struggles beyond the bounds of the anti-monarchist struggle, and monopoly capital which had assented to the Shah's downfall in a power struggle with the rank of the revolution, both reached a compromise at one point, namely the Shah's downfall and the, preservation of the sway of capital with minimum destruction of the governmental machine, that is precisely the position of the liberal bourgeoisie. The transformation of the governmental apparatus to the liberal bourgeoisie enjoying the moral support of the petty-bourgeois leadership and the material support (though undoubtedly temporary) of monopoly capital, was planned. The contract for "the end of revolution" was signed by the two parties of the deal. The army was announced as the brother of the masses, and Bazargan as the popular premier; arms were declared as forbidden for the masses and as lawful for the state barracks; and an all-sided endeavour to prevent an armed insurrection, which had already turned into the slogan of the masses, was launched.
However, it must be pointed out here that if the petty-bourgeois leadership and the liberal bourgeoisie had in their mind achieved in this deal all that they perceived as victory, monopoly capital had merely resorted to a tactical retreat. In the epoch of imperialism and in a dominated country, the liberal bourgeoisie cannot he the stable representative of the interests of the total social capital, a capital which has so fused with the operation of the imperialist monopolies. Monopoly capital had clearly defined and portrayed in the Shah's government its desirable government, which as already mentioned is the government supporting all strata of capital in the country; and Lt is precisely such government that imperialism has attempted, and is attempting, to re-establish (though not necessarily in its previous form). In this way, the tactical conformity of monopoly capital's positions with those of the liberal bourgeoisie was a passing conformity, and a result of monopoly armed insurrection provided the grounds for an ever quicker agreement. But the Uprising turned this bourgeoisie's nightmare into reality and, despite being left incomplete, extensively demonstrated its effects on the governmental apparatus granted to the liberal bourgeoisie. An ever faster move was there-fore placed on the agenda of the bourgeoisie and imperialism to discover that final form of political leadership which could this time recognize the uprising as a reality. The Bazargan's government did not take over the levers of power intact, nor did it take delivery of obedient, contented and unarmed workers and toilers. Hence, the renovation of these levers, disarming of the masses and securing their obedience of the government, was again turned into the practical task of the bourgeoisie. This government, however, as it was also shown in practice, could not be the government of the liberal bourgeoisie. By their bloody insurrection, the masses thwarted the plot of ending the revolution, and intended for its continuation. This automatically offset the role of the liberal bourgeoisie, making evident the need for the re-interference of "the leadership of the revolution', and in particular, Ayatollah Khomeini himself, to bridle the revolution. A bourgeois-liberal government, enjoying the moral support of the petty-bourgeois "leader-ship", could have operated as an effective instrument in putting an end to the revolution, only if the circumstances did not lead co an insurrection. But, the insurrection took place, and the conformity of monopoly capital's position with that of the liberal bourgeoisie, too, came inevitably to an end. For, when the masses broke up the agreed relations between the forces and constituent parts of the camp of the counter-revolution, these forces also inevitably regarded the agreements between them as dissolved, and set out again to achieve a new point of compromise, based on new realities, and undoubtedly with new expectations (the exception being the liberal bourgeoisie which was for a relatively long time confused and astonished on the violation of the agreement by the others). "The numerous centres of power", this nightmare of the liberal-bourgeois such as Bazargan and Bani-Sadr, before being a manifestation of the self-existent rivalry among the bourgeois political forces to attain a greater share in political power, was the product of the stroke delivered by the Uprising upon their agreements. Monopoly capital, in particular, rapidly understood this reality, i.e. the determining effect of the Uprising on the concrete political conditions in the society, and resumed its attempt to find that specific political force which would be prepared, more than all others, to bridle the revolution after an insurrection which had led to the arming of the masses and the expansion of the exercise of their direct will. This political force could only be the petty-bourgeois current which had until the compromise the leadership of the movement in its hand, namely the clergy and Ayatollah Khomeini at its head; a force which completely took hold of the bridle of the petty-bourgeoisie and in particular its traditional section; a force which, on the one hand, was wholeheartedly interested in suppressing the revolution which was about to demonstrate, more clearly and inevitably in a revolutionary ideological framework, its anti-imperialist content, and on the other hand, enjoyed an extensive influence among the revolutionary masses, enabling it to accomplish the monopoly capital's desirable counter-revolutionary role; in one word, it was a force which wanted to, and could, attack the revolution under the name of revolution. Therefore monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeois leadership both took a new step forward in the same direction, whereas the liberal bourgeoisie which was, as at the Shah's time, lagging a phase behind in analyzing the concrete conditions in the society, insisted on, and recalled, the items of the contract, advocating the necessity of remaining faithful to them. The rise of the IRP as the standard-bearer of the suppression of the revolution was the product of this common direction taken by monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeois leadership; and the unstable governments of Bazargan and Bani-Sadr were the reflection of the political naivety of the liberal bourgeoisie. Once again, and this time even with the formation of the cabinet, the liberal-bourgeois were placed in the opposition, whereas monopoly capital by temporary substitution of the clergy's influence, and in particular that of Ayatollah Khomeinie among the confused masses, for [Shah's] Guard corps and Rangers, and from the position of strength, set out to pursue the policies of Oveisi, Azhari, Rahimi and Bakhtiar[3]. Right here we must emphasize that the extent to which the clergy and in particular Ayatollah Khomeinie himself are aware of their instrumental role in the service of the suppression of the revolution and re-establishment of the indisputable sway of monopoly capital, is by no means a deter-mining factor. The signs of the awareness in Ayatollah Khomeinie are much less evident than in the likes of Beheshties and Khameneis and Ayats; the IRP, which is a combination of the latter group, reflects in its policies a much more conscious conformity with the needs of monopoly capital (we shall explain this conformity in detail in the next parts). What is important is the understanding of the direction of the movement of capital in the sphere of politics, and thereby, the under-standing of the new manifestations of the conflicts within the bourgeoisie.
The separation of monopoly capital from the liberal bourgeoisie, after a short period of tactical unity, and its tendency to hide behind those currents enabling it to employ the influence of the petty-bourgeois leader-ship in the service of the suppression of the Iranian revolution and maintain the camp of the counter-revolution, are the manifest feature of the policy of imperialism after the Uprising. In our belief, the IRP -- as a political organ and not necessarily its individual members -- is precisely an instrument serving this specific policy of monopoly capital. Hence, any kind of analysis of the present political situation which assesses the moves of the petty bourgeoisie and the clergy leading it, merely on the basis of the
Iranian petty-bourgeoisie's interests in itself, or on the self-existent interests of its politicians and leaders, has gone astray. Such deviations go so far that, in the analysis of the conflicts between the factions of the government -- a government that we all agree upon its service to capital and its enmity to the proletariat -- the question is wholly presented as a struggle between the potty-bourgeois and the bourgeois factions of the government, and thus monopoly capital, this consistent and ever present enemy of our revolution, is either left out entirely of the internal conflicts of the bourgeoisie, or is quietly turned into one of the clients of Bani-Sadr's faction (the liberal bourgeoisie). Whereas in our belief, monopoly capital , With the particular instrumental role it has prepared by the aid of the IRP for the clergy, Ayatollah Khomeini and the backward masses of the petty bourgeoisie, and the liberal bourgeoisie, which following the agreements of the winter of 57 (1979-Ed) as well as Bani-Sadr's success in the presidential elections, despite all its passivity and discredit, takes hold of the executive and governmental organs, still constitute the two sides of the struggle within the bourgeoisie; the only difference being that this time the policies, slogans and methods employed in this struggle have to a great extent changed.
Hence, if until before the February Uprising, monopoly capital in :he course of its retreat was temporarily in a tactical unity with the liberal bourgeoisie, after the Uprising, when the suppression of the revolution under the name of revolution and with the mobilization of the broad masses of the petty-bourgeoisie became a practical need of the counter-revolution, a tactical unity was brought forth temporarily between monopoly capital and the petty-bourgeoisie's counter-revolutionary leadership; thus the IRP which was the organisational instrument of this new unity, turned into the main lever of monopoly capital in suppressing the revolution. But, does this mean that the liberal bourgeoisie is drawn into contradiction with the aims of monopoly capital in as far as Iran's economy and revolution is concerned? Not at all. The root of the conflicts and disagreements between monopoly capital and the bourgeois-liberal faction of the government lies not in their aims but in their methods. We shall discuss this question in detail in the next parts, and are here content with mentioning some general points: The Iranian liberal bourgeoisie, in the course of one and a half years being in the position of administering the executive duties of the accumulation of capital as well as maintaining and consolidating the productive order, has step by step understood the role played in this respect by the Shah's government in the service of all strata of the bourgeoisie. The ideological separation of the non-monopoly bourgeoisie of Iran from the government it has lost (this compassionate guardian appointed by the imperialist monopolies) has more than ever lessened. Today, the Iranian non-monopoly bourgeoisie more than ever clearly under-stands its deep link with imperialism and with its long term objectives in Iran. This understanding, this bourgeoisie's deep hatred for revolution, has been frequently asserted in various terms by Bazargan, Bani-Sadr, and their colleagues. If, however, the liberals are today acquiring the necessary political intelligence to understand and admit the long-term objectives of imperialism in Iran, they cannot, as the representatives of non-monopoly capital, conceal their anxiety about the methods adopted by monopoly capital to revive the "good old days". For non-monopoly capital, the revolution was a painful course of destruction of the foundations of profit making and the accumulation of the foundations of profit making and the accumulation of its capital. In contrast to the imperialist monopolies, non-monopoly capital does not possess the economic capacity of enduring such as long period of anarchy in production. Hence, "that is enough! The productive order must be ever more quickly restored". But, as to how this aspiration could come true, bourgeois-liberalism still suffers from its illusions, illusions which undoubtedly reflect its shaky passive and limited economic base. Whilst monopoly capital, as we already said, has based its long-term move for the restoration of this productive order upon organising the camp of the counter-revolution and attempting to establish a counter-revolutionary order -- a policy which can temporarily be in contradiction with production and its order -- the liberal bourgeoisie, whose point of departure is the daily accumulation of capital in the domestic market, tries to stride over these necessary and practical, but painful and expensive steps. The liberal bourgeoisie demands the end of revolution without the realistic organisation of the counter-revolution, or at least without the best method of its organisation, and thus, being drawn in its illusions, once again comes into contradiction with the farsightedness of the imperialist monopolies. If until before the Uprising, the two monopoly and liberal factions within the bourgeoisie were bargaining on the way and extent of bunging about changes in the form of government, after the uprising these bargainings were carried on around the ways and methods of suppressing the revolution. However, a detailed elaboration of this discussion should be left to the next part.
Let us summarize what we have so far said: in our belief, neither of the two factions existing in the present government are the direct representatives of the whole of the interests of monopoly capital -- and thereby the ultimate saviours of the bourgeoisie -- in our country. Seek representatives can only be the product of that political synthesis we already pointed out. And as long as the necessary and adequate conditions for the emergence of this synthesis (the third alternative), on the basis of a certain relationship between the two camps of the revolution and the counter-revolution, are not provided, such representatives will not be put forward by monopoly capital in the practical arena of politics. Today, monopoly capital has not presented a direct and fully qualified representative against the representatives of the other strata of the bourgeoisie (including the petty-bourgeoisie), but, whilst preparing the grounds for its direct representatives to appear in the scene, is essentially pursuing its policy by means of the existing ruling body with the existing composition. The conflicts within the ruling body and the political struggles among the factions are above all a reflection of the attempts by monopoly capital in organising the suppression of revolution on the one hand, and in regaining political hegemony in the ranks of the bourgeoisie by rejecting liberalism and advocating its independent alternative on the other hand. Whilst both factions of the ruling body are operating, in the hands of monopoly capital, as effective, complementary and irreplaceable instruments in confronting the revolution, and thus, at this specific Juncture, possess a vital role for imperialism, both must be driven back in the face of the growth of the genuine alternative of monopoly capital; they must operate without being consolidated. That is why we call both factions existing in the government as bourgeois-imperialist, without regarding either of them as the direct representative and the desirable and ultimate alternative of monopoly capital. Neither theocracy advocated by the IRP, which is a cover to legitimize the policy of fierce suppression of the masses, nor Liberalism advocated by Bani-Sadr's faction, which is a new lever for bourgeois demagogy and justification of the crimes of the regime and a means to defend the capitalist order of production, would provide the governmental superstructure of capital in the event of its victory over the revolution. However, they are both, in practice, the constituents of a single counter-revolutionary policy. As long as the third alternative is not brought forth and the grounds for its emergence are not provided, the bourgeoisie would not be able to rid itself of these differences. Rather, it is precisely these very differences that on the one hand enable the present factions in the ruling body to play their particular role at the present juncture, and on the other hand, create the necessity and possibility of the rise of a political synthesis. These differences are neither accidental nor fabricated, but thoroughly reflect the reality and nature of the two factions existing in the camp of the counter-revolution. The IRP and Bani-Sadr's faction, on the basis of their nature, on the basis of what they are, occupy a place in the general policy of imperialism. Hence, in order to analyze how each of them fulfils their place in this policy, a matter which is our main objective in approaching their differences, we must first take a look at the positions and the class bases of the positions of these two currents on the questions facing the counter-revolution. We have summarized these questions into two fundamental questions:
How must the revolution be suppressed? And, how must the accumulation of capital be resumed?
Therefore, for assessing the two factions, and in fact, for explaining and elaborating what we only mentioned in this part, and also for making clear the communist attitude towards the two factions, we first start with the examination of the position each of the two takes on these two questions.
Notes
[1] "Aryamehr" was Shah's title. So the term refers to the kind of systematically institutionised and stable repressive conditions under the Shah. --Ed.
[2] Reference is made to the slogans of the National Front (the ancestors of the present liberals) during the Shah's Land Reform. --Ed.
[3] Shah's military men and premier during the months before the Feb. Uprising. --Ed.
